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The notion that thought is a constitutive principle
in experience was first clearly formulated by Kant,
Tt wa3 designed by him to meet a particular situa-
tion ; that is 4 it wa3 a device for overcoming the
irrationality of Hume's wotId, wherein sensations
drifted free and undetermined, at the mercy of blind
Chance. Remembering this, we are led to inquire wheth
er the conception still serves a similar purpose ?
Can constitutive thought have any value, except in
relation to 3uch a problem as that supplied by Hume?
These questions are especially pertinent
since modern psychology has rejected the atomism of
Hume's school. We have come to look upon ris sensa-
tionalism as artificial and bizarre. We recognize tha
what i3 given in experience is not a "manifold of
sensations", but an organized situation within which
sensations are distinguished according to the work
in hand. We are unable to discover sensations apart
from such total situations. Curiously enough, ideal-
ism has been glad to accept this point of view, and
even to make 3took of it. Can it consistently do
so ? Does not the constitutive concert ion of thought
lean entirely for support upon tl^e Humian doctrine of
immediacy ?

We remember that Kant proceeded against
Hume by accepting his sensational manifold, and ad-
ding to it constitutive thought-relations. In the
same fashion all idealism assumes a manifold, whose
unity must be explained. The invariable function of
a transcendental is to hold a manifold in order j it
is introduced for the precise reason that sensations
cannot unite themselves. In idealistic procedure
this manifold may bo derived by logical inference
from experience, or immediate experience may be
defined as fragmentary, incomplete, and insufficient
unto itself. But however obtained, we cannot imagine
a transcendentalism which, does not rest upon such an
interpretation of the given. A complete world-order
is in the nature of the case an eternally related
manifold.
This conception contrasts sharply with
what we may call the functional view of experience.
For the latter there is no sensational manifold
which needs relating, Sensations are abstractions
out of the coherent given, and not primitive facts.
The world which v;e immediately know is like a"seam-
less garment*, which requires no added unity; in
James' phrase, experience "leans upon itself." It
is indeed strange that idealism should approve such

a description of the given, for it contradicts that
view of immediaoy without which idealism cannot survi-
ve .
It is evident, granting the validity of
our distinction between the two views, that idealism
cannot get along by adhering consistently to either
of them. We may well expect to find it3 exponents
shifting ground from one to the other as occasion
requires; and it is precisely this charge that has
been so vigorously urged by modern writers.
It is our purpose, in considering Greenes
system, to point out how ho i3 guilty of such incon-
sistency. The task is not altogether an easy one,
for this writer, mindful of the dangers of dualism,
fi ves attention almost exclusively upon "relations",
and talks little of sensations. The manifold is
introduced, as it were, surreptitiously. But it is
there, and the "unalterable system of related elements"'
is its outcome. At the same time, he holds a function •
al view of thought and immediacy, and moves from one
to the other, according to the requirements of the
moment
,
Within human experience thought is func-
tional, and sensations are abstractions . In reality-
at-lar.;:e, we have thought constituting sensations into

a related system of elements* Inevitably, the tvro
come into conflict. This is the typical idealistic
dilemma . the finite and the infinite cannot be
nade to harmonize. As re hope to show, no reconcil-
i at ion in possible until one of the contradictory




Green acknowledges his indebtedness to Kant
in the many passages wherin he refers to the lat-
ter' s work. Of the Kantian point of view in gener-
al, he Bpeaka as follows : "The difference between
what may be broadly called the Kantian view and the
ordinary view is this, that whereas according to the
latter, it is a world ir which thought is no neces-
ear»y factor that is prior to, and independent of
the process by which this or that individual becomes
acquainted with it, according to the former it is a
" rorld already determined by thought*'.
Here we have distinctly stated the doctrine
that thought is constitutive, in Kant's sense.
But as we have noted, Kant's relations were intro-
duced to hold a manifold in order. Tq may therefore
expect to find a similar manifold in Green's system.
Kant, we remember, begins frankly with a sepa-
ration between thought and sense. To this Green
objects. "This apparant ascription of nature to a
two-fold origin- an origin in understanding in re-
spect of its form as a nature, as a single system
of experience ; an origin elsewhere of the 'matter'
X All references in this paper are to the "Prolegomena
to Ethics?', third edition, published by the
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1830.

which through the action of understanding becomes
a nature, cannot Nut strike us as unsatisfactory"
(
T
'gs. 15-16) This is a peculiar evasion of the real
is3ue, for whether the manifold is wput w tor: ether
or eternally "held 1* together, the distinction be-
tween sense and thought is not les? genuine. Green
must have relationless sensations. Let us find them*
"Tf we take any definition of matter, any ac-
count of Its necessary qualities, and abstract frorr
it all that consists in a statement of relations be-
tween facts in the way of feelings* or between ob-
jects that we present to ourselves as sources of feel-
ing; we shall find there is nothing left (Pg. 13)
On casual examination this characteristic passage
seems to deny a separation between sense and thought,
object and understanding. But let us fix our attention
upon the word 'matter 1 . Matter is by definition that
which is not thought, and contains no thought. This
is precisely what Green means ; *sensat ion' is used in
an equivalent sense. He proceeds : "And we shall
try in vain to render an account to ourselves of po-
sition or succession, of a body and its identity,
except as expressing relations of what is contained
in experience, through which alone that content pos-
1,




have then, a manifold, which is obtained by
breaking experience up into thought -stuff or, the one
hand, and natter, or 'content' on the other. There
can be no doubt that for Green this distinction is
an absolute one. Matter cannot be thought, or thought
natter. The manifold is genuine. Tn fact, he cannot
do without it, for by means of this absolute distinc-
tion he gets his transcendental. Consider, for instance,
the following: "TThat then, is the source of these rela-
tions, as relations of the experienced :, in other
words, of that which exists for consciousness ? T'hat
is the p rinoiple of unity which renders then possible ?"
* Fe shall still be logical] y "x>und to admit that for
a nan who can know a nature, for when there is a cos-
mos of experience, there is a principle which is
than to hold the manifold in order. It is needed be-*
cause the sensations cannot relate themselves. Matter
cannot create consciousness out of itself, nor can it
form itself into a rational world so organized that
"the relations expressed by our definitions of natter
and notion arise therein," The separation between
thought and ratter is as absolute as could be desired;
This non -natural principle has no other function

band without it there would be no transcendental
problem
•
Th e conception of the £iven is to be found on
practically every page of Green's work. One of the
most illuminating discussions is to h o found in his
analysis of the temporal series. "ITo one and no
number of a series of related events can be a con-
sciousness of the series as related. For can any pro-
duct of the series be so either. "(Pg. 20-31) Why
does he say thig ? Because the series is a succession
of unconscious particles, which cannot relate them-
selves. Such a manifold could only be held in order
by a transcendental. By this type of argument, Green
establishes the necessity for a world-consciousnesc
.
So much for the sensations. Nor for the relations.
Kant made our understanding their source. But for
Green this will not do. In a passage already cited,
he objects to giving sense and thought a «eparate
origin. It i3 not to our understanding that the mani-
fold is given, for the experience which we know is
already "organized". Remember that ho has first de-
scribed the giver as a manifold:, as a series, for
instance, of material atoms. The two opposed views
of immediacy frequently stare at us from the same
page.

Fe get the key to the situation by discovering
a second separation of sense and thought in his analy-
sis of the hur.an thinking -process, Kant had aaid that
the human understanding "makes nature* ; Green saya
it cannot* "Tt is true on the one hand as has just
been adrr.it ted, that in a great part of our lives we
feel without thinking, and with cut any qualification
of our feelings by our thought, while yet, on the
other hand, we are subjects to whom facts can ap-
pear." (Pg, 51). ^e cannot, therefore, hold things
in order, just because we think only occasionally.
"It certainly does not depend on any power which
we can suppose it rests with our wills to exert, or
withhold, whether the sensations shall occur to us
in this or that order of aucceaaion, with this or that
degree of intensity". The task of holding the man-
ifold in order, supplying its relations, is too
great for human understanding; ran absolte is re-
quired.
This is becaiise we have subject sharply
distinguished from object, knowor from known. The
human mind can copy, or recognize reality; it cannot
make it for itself, just because its position is over
against the given, and not a part of its intimate
structure. The thought in the given is the absolute's;




Green, of course, does not hold consistently to
this dualism, but there are a number of passages
in which it is plainly affirmed. In a quotation
air cay given, Green remarks that thought is " prior
to the process with which this or that individual
becomes acquainted with it." Again, "Since it is
obvious that the facts of the "-orld do not come into
being when this or that person becomes acquainted
with them, so long as we conceive of no intellectual
action but that which this or that person exeroises,
we necessarily regard the existence or oocurence of
the facts a3 independent of intellectual action. 11 (Fg 36)
"In every case the relations "~>y which the given sensa-
tion^ is determined in the a: rreh ens ion of the per-
cepient, are but a minute part of those by which it is
really determined." (Pg.68)
The only conclusion to be drawn from such
an analysis is that our finite though t*p roc esses do
not and cannot give experience its unity and order,
these must be sun lied from some single souroe ; a
•unity of a-' perception' , or world-consciousness.
Tn relation to this the many human minds merely per-
form 'act3 of apprehension', or acts of 'becoming
acquanited with ' . To say that "we car.not su-pose it
rests with our wills to exert or withhold- whether
sensations 3hall an ear in this or that order of
succession'', is to deny that our individual thought
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exerts any influence whatever upon the world. It oannot
add or detract one jot. It so stands apart from the
flow of events as never to disturb them* If this is
not what Green means, what does he mean ?
Let us see where we stand. Green begins with a
sensational manifold, secured by making an absolute
distinction ^etwe^n sense and thought. He then has
the problem of relating the manifold. He intorduces
a transcendental, non~natural principle to do the
work , on the ground that cur finite understanding
is not equal to the ta^k. This leaves finite intelli-
gence with nothing to do, and introduces a dualism
between human thought and its transcendentally related
given. This second distinction between sense and
thought, we shall discover, results in a discrerancy
between the finite and the infinite which no logic
can overcome.
f5uch a condition of affairs would not be pos-
sible, except by alternation between two distinct
conceptions of thought and experience. At one time
the given is a manifold, and thought constitutive.
At another the given is an organized experience, and
thought a temporal prooess functioning within exper-
ience. Let us note more carefully the character of the
opposite conceptions, as presented by Green.





1 . The given is a manifold* As we have seen, Green
establishes this by breaking up experience into sense
and thought « Let us gee how carefully he preserves
the distinction. "Yet we cannot ignore sensation.
We cannot reduce the world of experience to a web of
relations in which nothing is related, as it would
be if everything * rere erased from it which we cannot
refer to the action of a combining intelligence. After
all our protests against dualism, then, are we not
at last left with an unaccountable residuum, an es-
sential element of the real world of experience, which
we cannot trace to what we regard as the organizing
1 rinciple of that world, but which is as necessary to
make the world what it is as that principle itself ? *
(pg. 45) On the next page he answers this. "Antecedent-
ly to any of the formative intellectual processes
which he can trace, it would seem that something must
have been given for those processes to begin with.
This something is taken to be feeling, pure and sim-
ple, when all accretions of form, due to the intel-
lectual establishment of relations, have been stripped
off, there would seem to remain the mere sensations
without which the intellectual activity would have had
nothing to deal with or operate upon. These then must
be in an absolute sense the matter- the matter ex-
cluding all form- of experience *.

IS
In another passage, he sa; r3: "It is true, a3 we
have seen, that single things are nothing except as
determined by relations, which are the negation of
their singleness, but they do not therefore cease to
be single things. On the contrary, if they did not
survive in their singleness, there could be no rela-
tion between them—." (Pg. 31) Again, "It is essential
to the comparison, essential, too, to their forming
an observable event or succession, that one should not
be fused with the other; that the distinot being of
each should be maintained. \ This insistence upon the
distinction can only ">e explained by Green's desire
to introduce a transcendental, and with it a com-
pletely determined, closed world-system.
Rut we must not forget that this very analysis
is the work of a finite intelligence. On his own
showing, experience is organized, and only a
logical analysis in human terms, can make it appear
as a manifold. Functional thought gives Green his
abstract sensations and relations.
2» The given is an organized experience. Green's
whole effort is to explain this unity, after he has
broken it up. by abstraction. Rut in this mood he no
longer insists upon the absoulteness of the distinc-
tions. "Mere sensation is in truth a phrase which
represents no reality; it is the result of a process
of abstraction . * Pg.48) "Mere feelings', then,
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as matter unformed by thought, has no place in the
world of fact3, in the cosmos of possible experience ",
(Pg,51). Rut if there is no unorganized experience ;
if sensation is a mere abstraction, why ao have
to account for the unit;* of experience ? This con-
ception of the given directly contradicts the first.
It is also interesting to note in connection
with this treatment of experience, that thought is
constitutive. It is explicitly non-temporal ; an
ontologioally real element which holds between sen-
sations. A3 temporal thought is needed to give us
the manifold by abstraction, so non-temporal thought
is reqiiired to explain the given an organized. Human
thought seems unable to deal with it3 own abstractions,.
3, Thought is constitutive. M?T ith such a combining
agency we are familiar as our intelligence. It is
through it that the sensations of th e present moment
take a character from comparison with the sensations of
a moment ago. "(Pg. 31) "The above is an instance
of relation between sensations which, as brought into
relation by intelligence, become sensible objects
or events." (Pg.52) Ve discover that this combining
intelligence is non-temporal. "Within the consciousness
that they are related in the way of before and after,
there is no before and after They form a pro-
cess in time. If it were a process in time, it -ould
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not be a consciousness of then as forming a process".
(Pg. 59), Furthermore, this consciousness is a
single 'unity of apperception 1 . "The unity of this
principle mast be correlative to the unity of ex-
perience. if there car. be no such thing
as an experience of unrelated objects; then there
must be a corresponding singleness in that principle
of consciousness which forms the bond of relation be-
tween objects." This must be so, since we are not
conscious of the whole in one timeless constitutive
act. Thought as constitutive, then, is the absoulte's,
and in this situation Green supposes that our thought
is a part of the absolute's.
4. Thought is temporal, and has a function
within experience. In this connection we have two
distinct conceptions to deal with, (a) Human thought
has no constitutive ability, but merely an r eh ends,
and cannot work any change upon the given. We had
already noted that the introduction of the absolute
leaves human thought with no work to do. "Hence it is
only the successive changes in our af-p reh ensive atti-
tudes toward/ the objects of our experience and know-
ledge that are commonly put to the account of con-
sciousness ... "(Pg .62) "The attainment of knowledge,
again, as an occurence in the individual's history,
a transition from one itate of knowledge to another,
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may be properly called a phenomenon, but not so the
consc ; ou3ness of relations as related facts." In
other words, our apprehension is a phenomenal pro-
cess, determined by the world-consciousness, but not
of itself able to do more than passively recognize,
(b) Knowing i3 both temporal, and has work to
do. It has the imposing task of distinguishing the
real from the unreal-, appearance from reality.
It determines truth and error. Here we have the gen-
uninely functional view of thought. Tt is the kind
of thinking that en^ables us to distinguish between
3ense and thought
, it is the judgment process for
which alone such distinctions have value. Concern-
ing the general character of functional thought we
shall have more to 3ay later, in the wa. of making
it 3 implications clearer. At present let us content
ourselves with a3 sharp a distinction as possible
b e tw e en th e two v i cws
,
The non -natural, constitutive principle 9 which
preserves the distinctions of our thinking prooess
When we no longer think, and makes them possible for
our thinking, must indeed be 'not -natural' :, not
only in the sense that it cannot arise out of matter,
but in the further sense that it performs a function
radically different from anything our own thought,
as temporal, can furnish. It does precisely the
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things that the consciousness we know cannot do, and
this is the very reason why it is introduced. Let
U3 briefly contrast the two, in regard to their most
essential characters. To can say concerning human
thinking, and to this Green would agree; 1. Tt is
a temporal process. 2. It is occasional. 3. Tt get3
its cue from experience. 4. Xt involves some compar-
ison with other than the given data. 5. Tt is par-
ticular, dealing with 3ome one fact which it 3e-jkd to
explain. But the world-consciousness, as constitutive,
ha3 opposite characters: 1. Its thinking is non-tempor_al
,
being the condition of time itself. 2. It is eternal,
and omnipresent in reality, as the knowex of all its
relations. 3. Tt receives no cue, and need3 no cue for
its operations, since it is eternally complete. 4. Tt
involves no act of comparison, since all its compari-
sons are already made. 5. Tt is not occupied with
single facts, but with all reality in equal degree.
These two conceptions are so opposed, to one an-
other, that they permit of no substitution, and
that one could never possibly perform the functions
of the other. They are to each other as mind is to
matter. In fact, this i3 at bottom the precise dis-
tinction between them. On the one hand, the absolute-
ness, the unalterableness of quant vty and quality
which physicists ascribe to matter, and on the other
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the notion and flow and incessant activity that we
as30ciate with mind. The static and the changing
seem eternal] y opposed. Ho?; can one be the other ?
The infinite's thought must remain a mystery to
us. Vaguely we represent it to ourselves as a
relating eternally complete; an order of ontologioal
realities; the framework in a world-edifice. We
can compare it only with those pyhsioal and mechanical
relations that we perceive in nature. But we never
confuse such structure With consciousness ; it is for
U3 the negation of mind. Does it seem t roper to call
such a being a consciousness ?
We are prapared to see that both the conceptions
of the given a3 a manifold, and of thought as con-
stitutive, are artificial and contradictory of the
direct evidence o^f- experience, which 5.3 the final
court of appeal* Green's modus operandi with these
abstractions i3 somewhat as follows: He analysers
experience, t] e unified given, and by a process of
abstraction breaks it up into a manifold. Taking
these elements to b© real, even though they are later
described as 'mere abstractions', he tries to unite
them into an experience once more. Functional thought,
which had di3tinquished the sensations, cannot deal
with the abstractions, so he at once concludes to an
a priori constitutive thought. This thought, we have
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also seen, is an abstraction to which no experienced
thought conforms. Having got the manifold related,
he declares that sense and thought are only relative
terms, which cannot exist apart, and thus denies his
own starting point. Moreover, in this situation he
leaves temporal thought with no occupation. All
relating is the work of the transcendental absolute,
which determines human thought -processes as it does ot_her
events. This would make the determination of truth
and error already comilete. But this will not do for
|t contradicts the facts of experience:, human consc-
iousness finds that truth and error are yet to e
determined. He therefore lets human consciousness do
this work, in which role it usurps prerogatives which
first belonged to the absolute. Only by shifting from
one point of view to the other, in thi3 fashion, is
a transcendental program possible.
But a consistent adLersnce to one or the other
must be demanded. Ve know thought as temporal, or as
non -temporal ; sensations as mere abstractions, or as
absolute entities ; relations as eternal meanings,
completed before we discover them, or as organic
processes from fact to fact through the empirical
'fundamontum'. Fhich shall we cheese ?
Rigid adherence to the constitutive view gives
us an eternally related manifold, an absolute system
of related elements, within which no incompleteness

a c
can exist. But experience in always* growing; this is
the surest fact. we know. Tn short, what we know
immediately, ©xperienoe, is juot what the absolute
System is not, A contrast of the two in more partic-
ular detail will be profitable. Can experience and
reality-at -large be reconciled.? And if we admit that
for experience the given is organized, and thought
able to work change, must wo not do away with^ con-
ceptions a3 cone into conflict with these primary
facts ? Tn other words, i3 the constitutive view able
to maintain itself when consistently carried cut ?

Ill
the finite and the
infinite
We have 3c far seen that Green presents his reader
with two different concept ions of thought and Im-
mediacy, whioh contradict one another at every oon-
oeiveable point. We have inquired whether there i3
a.
any possibility of reconciling the two ; whther finite
thought and experience can he a part of that "single
and unalterable system"' which is the "real" universe.
It is interesting to note in this connection that
Ore m explicitly admits our consciousness to have a
double aspect. We have not, he insists, two conscious-
nesses, but the "one indivisible reality of our con-
sciousness cannot be comprehended under a single con-
ception. w (Pg.73) They must, then, be comprehended
under two conceptions. On the ore hand the absolute,
constitutive thought, which i3 non -temporal, and on
the other the finite, functional, temporal thought
upon which we exclusively depend for our information.
But is not this an admission that the two definitions
of thought are so opposed as to defy all attempts
to bring them under one conception ? Is it not a
naive confession of Green's inability to get along
with them except by alternating from one to the other
as emergency demands ?
We noted in our first section that Green, after
separating experience into 3ense and thought by
abstraction, proceeds to a second separation between

the unified given and human thought. It is this
second separation with Whieh we are now confronted.
It works out into an inevitable dualism between
the finite thinker with his unique experience,
and the constituted reality "beyond". Let us re-
mind ourselves once more of the completeness of
this separation.
1. Constitutive thought , that of the world-
consciousness, is first of all that which holds the
given in order. It unites sensations into an order-
ly experience, so that "the relations expressed by
our definitions of matt orand motion arise therein",
(Pg.14). Rut it is not only this. It must close up
the gap between our thought on the one hand, and
the experience which it knows on the other. Thus
Green says that the principle of unity is "something
whichwh ioh as the source of a connected e perience
renders both the nature that we know and our know-
ledge of it possible". (Fg. 14) At a later point he mak
an even more precise statement. "And when the reading
i3 over, the consciousness that the sentence has a
meaning has become a consciousness of what in partic-
ular the meaning is; a consciousness in which the
successive results of the mental operations involved
in the reading are held together without succession,
as a connected whole". (Pg.76)
Ie such a situation the absolute's thought con-
J
?3
stitutes our mental op erations .re might expect this,
because our thinking is temporal, and that of the
infinite the condition of time. Put in these cir-
cumstances our thought is data "or the infinite
to constitute. The infinite thought cannot therefore
enter into or fee the data, without losing its
character a3 constitutive. The dualism, on these
grounds, i3 completely established, and there re-
mains no possibility of showing that one "is" the
other
,
2, "Our knowledge" of nature on the one hand,
and nature as it "Really" is on the other, are
Sharply distinguished from one another. Green admits
in many passages that what we take an object to be,
our "opinion" of it, is not at all what it is in
its reality. MrT1ho illusive appearance* as opposed
to the reality, of any event, is what the event
really is not jbut at the same time it is really
something. It is real, not indeed with the particular
reality which the subject of the illusion ascribes
to it, but with a reality which a superior intelli-
gence might understand". (Pg . 26).
Now what does th s mean if not that the event
or object is one thing for the infinite, and another
for us ? Taking the situation quite literally, the
infinite, in order to be our consciousness j must:

1. Know and net know the object in it3 full reality
at. the same tine. 2, Must have illusions and prob-
lems to puzzle over, while at the same time its
problems are all solved, and its knowledge so com-
plete that illusion is impos dole, might go on
with a long list of the contradictory things the
absolute would have to do to hold experience within
itself, but one example is as good as a dozen.' There
is no consciousness that could know our experience
and know everything there i3 to know at the same time.
Tn other words, finite thought and infinite thought
cannot belong to the same individual.
3. The most interesting phase of the situation,
and one which cannot be too strongly insisted upon,
is that constitutive thought, and its absolute order
of reality, is something altogether mysterious and
incomprehensible from our human point of view. An
a~; peal to introspection fail3 to give us any cue
to a consciousness which is unalterable in its de-
terminations, for the only consciousness that we know
and can represent to ourselves is dynamic, progressive,
working changes in the world through its activities,
a consciousness whioh changes nothing, whose judg-
ments make no differences to our world, is, as
flewey would remark, a "dark saying 11 .
The same may be said for that "single and un-

alterable system of relations" which Is the infinite
manifold constituted by the infinite consciousness.
C-reen's effort to describe this in human terms is
interesting. At one time he conceives that we know
it directly, as if by a kind of intuition. Thus he
says that in making judgments of truth and error,
we contrast "each experience as it occurs with a
single and unalterable system of relations Cf This
would seem to mean that as finite beings we actually
have rower to grasp the universe in one single act
of comprehension. But this is contradicted, not
only by the many passages in which he explicitly
admits our limitations, but by the fashion in which
he illustrates our determinations of truth and
error. Here we find that we draw a contrast, not
between a given fact and a "single and unalterable
system", but re refer the faot to other particular
finite experiences. Thus, in his discussion of the
position of the hill, (Pg. 37 3 , he plainly says
that we contrast yesterday's appearance of the hill
with today's, in order to correct our first impres-
sion. Similarly, the engine driver, (Pg .16) 'sees
a signal wrong', and still the seeing was a fact; it
had its own reality. It remained this reality until
by determining the relations "between the present
state of the latter and certain determining con-
\
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ditions — as full and definite, with sufficient
inquiry and opportunity, an ascertainable , as in
any case of normal vision", he corrects his first
impression. Tt i3 by enquiry into other experien-
tial facts that the correction is made, and the
signal becomes another kind of fact than it was.
We find it shown in illustration of the judgment
process how the particular facts are contrasted with
the absolute system* The reason, beyond doubt, is
that the latter, as possible experience, is ruled
out by every consideration, logical and x>sycholo-
gical, that enters into the problem,
Tt is in vain, then, that we seek to
represent to ourselves the "single and unalterable
si'-atem of related elements" which Green conceives
reality to be. This is a good and sufficient reason
for rejecting it; for as unmeaning and incompre-
hensible, it has no value and therefore ro validity
as a hypothesis. A world so unrelated to our cwn as
to be forever beyond our vision might as well be
non-existent
.
4. A consistent carrying out of the func-
tional view which Green introduces at various points,
and especially in the discussion of truth just
mentioned, renders the opposite conception impos-
sible. There is not merely a separation between the
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two points of view; the two conceptions of conscious-
ness. T^ey cannot e?'ist together; one must go. The
functional kind of thought, however, is that which
we know in terms of experience itself. Of its validity
and value we can have no doubt. Let us see how, carri__ed
out, it makes the contrary view impossible.
We find that Green's last resource, in his attempt
to make the absolute system intelligible, is to
such arguments as this:Te regard it" (Intellectual
progress) was a progress toward the attainment of
knowledge or true ideas. But we cannot suppose that
the relations of facts or objects in consciousness
„„ first comes into being when we attain that
knowledge " . "What it was really, it was unalterably"
,
He appeals to experience to show that after
making a discovery, we suppose our new object to have
been there all the time. The future is already made;
any progress of ours is merely one of discovery of
that prepared future. This means that the results
of our own thought-processes must be ignored; that
the change-- which they bring about must be read
back into the antecedent situation. Rut will nuch
a conception work? Let us see what functional thought
requires for its operation in the way of data.
Our attention must now center more directly
upon those facts which for our e perience, as Green
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admits, "grow", and seer, not to have the unalter-
ablenass which he conceives then to "really" have.
What is the character of these facts, which serve
as datum for our finite thought ? And under what
conditions do they lead us to believe that they
were always what we no" find then to be ?
Let us examine the content's of a single mo-
ment's experience, and 3ee what they are like. Fhat
does this moment's experience contain ? As T write
this paper in my own little room, more or less shut
off from the world without, T am none the less con-
scious of the bustle and hum and clatter of the teem-
ing life be ^ond. X hear the whistle and rush of a
distant locomotive, the sound of a foot-ball and
mens' voices, the clattering of a wagon on the
brick pavement, and the narking of dogs near and far.
Through the heavy lace curtains. I see dimly the sunlit
stre ;t with its houses, and the figures of men and
autos passing to and fro. Such a situation is famil-
iar enough. But how shall we explain its order,
coherence and unity ?
T might say concerning aaoh of the noises and
sight 3 that each of them represents or means its
object. I hear a whistle, and infer that there is a
locomotive yonder ; T hear a noise like barking, and
judge that it represents a dog ; I see a dim figure
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passing the window, and "know" that it is a man. But
thin is obviously no t what I do. There is no dis-
tinction between noise and fcrain, or bark and dog.
There are sintple facts, and nothing more. No judg-
ment or thought process is concerned with them.
Tl ey have no "meaning", T am not conscious of them
as related to anything. At first hand, then, and this
is testimony furnished easily to us all, we find evi-
dence to contradict Green's fundamental assumption.
Every fact is not a faot for a "knower". Fe have
troubles enough without thinking about ever2* object
that comes into e-rperience '» sn^ objects serve us
better when we are n6t compelled to worry about
th em •
Put we may deal with these facts in thcught.
Te can a.3k what the noise means. As a general state-
ment it is true that we can make any fact the object
of a judgment. T^ut we cannot make all facts the ob-
ject of judgement at an'- one time. That is eiyrf^ally
clear. But when do facts become objects for judg-
ment ? When do they have meaning, and ^hen are they
simple facts ?
The obvious answer is that we think about
things when they puzzle us. they do not present
themselves as promlems arbitraril]''. It is alwa3'-s
in relation to some purpose, or activity, that we

are puzzled. The purpose may not be a well -defined,
one ; we may we may be scarcely conscious or not at
all conscious of it as purpose? but we will find that
our interpret at ions are always in motor terms, and
have to do with our activities. If some men think
more than others it is because they have more am-
bition, more purposes ; more things to do or that they
expeot to do.
Green speaks of human consciousness as related to
the organism. Tt is through the organism that the
eternal consciousness reproduces itself in us. But
let us forego the cons id.erat ion of the eternal
purpose which is beyond our ken, and agree with
Green that consciousness as we know it is indeed
related to the organism and its activities. In such
a familiar situation we have described, ' it is
easily seen, wo adjust ourselves easily and hab-
itually to our environment. The noises and sights
in our illustration are familiar, and we adapt
oursalves to them without jar or effort. These
habitual adjustments, have of couse, been aoquired.
Rut so far as their itatus in consciousness in con-
cerned, they play the same role as instinctive ones.
However, when an o bg ect ruzzles us, it is be-
cause "*r e are not able to adjust to it smooth!}'. Ytfiat
i=? it ?- means, Hiat shall T do about it ? In general,
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then, facts become objects for thought when they are
strange or r roblemat ic with reference to some pur-
pose. And this always means that smooth and easy ad-
justment is inhibited .As when the object is familiar,
adjustment is achieved before thought can intervene,
so when the object is strange it demands thought
as the means to adjustment. Fhen such a process is
ended, the object is familiar, and we can deal with
it habitually, without recourse to thinking. In this
connection we must not lose sight of the organic
character of the total situation. The adjustment
does not cause the object to ohange, any more than
the object causes the adjustment. The are co-ordinate
asj eots of one process.
r e are now prepared to see that "meaning" is
correlated with this prooess of adjustment. Meaning
i3 not a something that stands between objects, but
a questioning attitude; not an ontological reality',
but the becoming situation psychologically described.
Wo have observed that the process of thinking is one
whereb^r a fact becomes other than it was. Now the
essential part of this otherness is in terms of the
readjustment that has been made, Fe descibe an object
most easily when we tell what can be done with it,
which "rould seem to indicate that meaning has its
greatest sifnificance in motor terms.
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Piat in any case, and we need net decide here
finally what meaning shall presicely designate,
it is not anything definite. If we identify it Wie-
the personal attitude, the latter is one of hesi-
tation, of indirection, lacking definiteness . If
it be identified with the object in its becoming,
the latter is likewise undetermined in regard to
its questioned character.
The ideational features of such a becoming
prooess are sometimes identified with the meaning*
We form various hypotheses concerning the object
and test them. These hypotheses might be called
ideas, but this is misleading, "For the thing tested
is always the object. Ts it this, or that ? Can I
do this or that with it ? Is it like thin or that
in certain respects ? Fe need not enter into a
detailed analysis of the thinking process. It does
indeed involve a reference of the fact in question
tc other facts. Put for our purposes this simply
means that our datum i3 always presented in a sit-
uation. It is always present, not as one completely
distinguishable fact, but as an object among objects.
And the prooess wherby it becomes more, is also
a process which changes its associates. Within this
total process there are no merely mental ideas. The
meaning still concerns our relation to the object,
H
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which in the total becoming reveals not only its
own change
,
but acts and reacts with those h3fo-
thetical ideas which are, after all, other facts,
upon which, as Jame3 might say, the thinking pro-
cess leans.
The gi3t of this discussion, which so far is
merely borrowed from contemporary psychology, / is
to show that "knowing" is a special act, arising
under special conditions, and having a definite
function to serve.
Within this process we are able to distinguish
betwe si datum and meaning, sense- and thought. But
with the termination of the process the distinction
ends. Meaning and d.atum flow back into the organic
unity of perception ; for human e-perience they
cotise to exi3t. Then the adjustment is made, and
purpose no longer inhibited, there is no need for
thought and its distinctions. We have arrived at that
satisfactory stage of experience, so far as the
present situation is concerned, where there is no
jar of rial -adjustment , or turmoil of conflicting
impulses, but a smooth and easy flow of the stream,
which is the end and ambition of all thinking. Thy
say, then, that the familiar object about ^hich we
do not trouble ourselves, is constituted by rela-
tions or meanings? If it has meaning, it is not for




This brings us directly to a question not yet
answered. What underlies Green's assurance that "llhat
it was really, it was unalterably"? This kind of
belief, of course, i3 ingrained in our very thought
and language "by centuries of teaching which made it
appear plausible. Put for philosophy tradition is
never sacred. Te must keep our minds free of preju-
dice.
First of all, then, we would call fresh attention
to the manner in which Green supposes the distinction
between thought and sense to persist after the
thinking process is ended. He forgets that such dis-
tinctions are purely arbitrary. A13 of our classifi-
cations, and the things that we designate by names
are real, in so far as they serve our purposes. But
only as purposive are they of value. To may take any
single object, as a chair, which we have distinguished
and given a name, and discover that the distinction
can never be absolute. For the object interpenetrates
with the air and its environment ; it is s^r.ember of
a larger situation in relation to which it is organ-
ically united. Ye often find ourselves paying attention,
not to the furniture in a room, but to the spaces
betwear. the objects, ^e can at will cut out and
distinguish the featuresjof the situation with whioh we
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wish to deal for the purposes in hand, just as we
can count 100 in tens, fives, or ones; and in this
arbitrary nanner we deal with alD facts. "Rut to
what extent are suoh distinctions absolute ? Not
at allj they are purely relative. A3 the human
body is one thing for the physician, another for
the arti3t, and still another for the lion, so is
all reality what we take it to be ; but never any-
thing absolute in itself. For the thinking process,
for the attainment of ends, such distinctions have
value, but within the satisfactory experience that
thought seeks to establish, they would be an annoy-
ance. Familiar objects, as distinctions within ex-
perience, do indeed have a relative permanence, as
meeting our common purposes and needs. Let them
cease to have value in relation to our activities,
and they too would go.
This in not to say that the results of thought
are net genuine. We have spoken of the process as one
of becoming, and such it is indeed. Tt changes the
very character of cur world. But is this new char-
acter the re3ult of the persisting thought -distinc-
tions ? Surely not. The setting off of qualities
and attributes, and "parta for the whole", which
suoh a process involves, F/ould he fatal to the unity
of reality did it persist. Tt is only when these

qualities and meanings have reeonbined into a
primeval unity that the character of the ob-
ject 1.8 definitely changed. The new character
is not a compound, or experienced as such, but
just that kind of perceptual unity in which thoughts
distinctions cease to exist* To just the extent, in
any situation, that we pay thoughtful attention to
our obj sot, is it distinct ; and as we attend from
it to some other ^object, it resolves itself into the
total situation which is total because of lack of
detailed distinction within it.
To take these distinctions as absolute is to
baffle thought in it 3 operations. The physicist,
however much he may persist in the notion that
matter i3 composed of atoms, still deals with it
in his practical erperiments as a unified mass
without regard to its 00; position. He must do so
in order to get along with itf how could he 3tudy
specific gravity, which requires dealing-in-the-ma3s,
if he were constantly compelled to think his sub-
stance as atonic ? He must not make the mistake,
then, of considering either absolute,
3ut it is precisely this kind of a distinction
that Green preserves a3 absolute, when he treats
relations and facts as constantly existing. Here
we arrive at mechanism. Tie gives us a structural
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universe within which sensations and relations per-
sist ; but aa they do not persist for finite exper-
ience, but arise only on occasion, he ia compelled
to say what principle ke^ps them distinct when not
thought about by us. Pragmatism, as we have seen,
describes the unity in terms of perception of ex-
* A
perience itself. Idealism must go beyond experience,
and posit an absolute. It appears a3 an artifi-
cial solution of an artificial problem.
The conclusion to which we are inevitably forced
is that functional thought, by reason of its re-
quirements, and the methods and result 3 of its
operation, cannot get along with a world which is
eternally fixed. Since the whole effect of consti-
tutive thought, consistently carried out, would
be to render functional thought inoperative, we
must oast the former aside a3- an" untenable hypothesis
.
Moreover, the functional view seems to require no
assistance from an extra-experiential source. Tt
furnish eg of itself a consistent description of
reality, as a constant becoming. Aside from the con-
sideration that this conception is more congistent
with tl e facts of life than its opposite, it has as
much and perhaps more value from an ethical and moral
point of view. Tn the long run, no doubt, this ia the
most important of all considerations. Tt must prove
itself as a practical Working hypothesis.
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